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LIMITS OF LITIGATION IN SOCIAL CHANGE.

By Aryeh Neier. Middletown, Conn.: Wesleyan University Press.
1982. Pp. 265. $17.95.
Until recently, some issues were never resolved in the courts. Racial discrimination, capital punishment, and the like were seen as
exclusively legislative issues, and the judiciary avoided what it considered unwarranted policymaking of its own. But this era ended
with Brown v. Board of Education 1 and its progeny, in which the
Supreme Court unanimously reached out to declare, in effect, an entire social order unconstitutional. Since Brown, advocates of causes
ranging from mental-health reform to Vietnam War protests have
turned to litigation as a means of winning battles considered unwinnable in the legislatures.2
As former National Executive Director of the American Civil
Liberties Union, Aryeh Neier helped lead the charge to the courts.
Now he has stepped back from the fray to examine the successes and
failures of cause litigation from the perspective of a law professor.
The result is a thought-provoking account in which Neier balances
his sympathy for the claims of the litigants against his concern that
some groups are using the courts to achieve results they could not
have attained through fair competition in the marketplace of ideas.
I. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
2. Obtaining judicial review may itself win the battle. For example, even unsuccessful
challenges to a power plant license can delay completion of the plant for many years and force
the utility to spend millions of dollars fighting the challenge, to the point where the utility
decides it will be better off dropping the license application entirely. See pp. 213-16.
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Neier begins his analysis with "the civics text model of pluralist
American democracy'' (p. 10), in which each constituency makes itself heard at the polls and society's leaders must listen in order to
remain in power. But special care must be taken to protect the rights
of those "discrete and insular minorities" unable to protect themselves through the political process: the mentally ill or the retarded,
for example.3 These groups exist apart from the rest of society,
which is content to warehouse them as cheaply as possible with little
concern for their well-being. On the other end of the spectrum are
diverse, more politically influential constituencies such as environmentalists or Vietnam War protesters, which suffer "from no handicaps in pursuing their goals through the political process" (p. 152).
Having fought their battle and lost, 4 they should not be given the
same second chance accorded those unable to fight for themselves,
argues Neier. Since judicial authority and legitimacy depend largely
on judicial self-restraint,5 lending the prestige of the courts to these
challenges diminishes the courts' ability to protect the otherwise
defenseless.
Most groups using litigation as a means for social change, however, fall somewhere between the helpless mental patient and the politically influential environmentalist. As examples, Neier discusses
litigation in the fields of race discrimination, voting rights, sex discrimination, abortion rights, welfare rights, government secrecy,
political surveillance, and capital punishment. He critiques the successes and failures in each field, often pointing out tactical errors or
mistaken assumptions that prevented the litigators from achieving
their goals. One major shortcoming has been a misreading of public
opinion. Early opponents of capital punis~ent were heartened by
declining public support for the death penalty and a declining
number of executions (p. 198), but they failed to press their advantage in the legislatures. Later, public opinion swung back in favor of
3. The phrase "discrete and insular minorities" originates in Justice Stone's famous dictum
in United States v. Carolene Prods., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938). This dictum has given rise to
a process theory of constitutional law exemplified in J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST
(1980). The notion that minorities are protected by participation in a pluralist democratic
process can be traced to James Madison's political theories. See THE FEDERALIST No. 10 (J.
Madison).
4. Judicial review of the warmaking power illustrates the courts' increased willingness to .
hear the claims of those represented in the political process. In Korematsu v. United States,
323 U.S. 214 (1944), the Supreme Court deferred entirely to an executive determination of the
existence of a threat to national security in upholding the internment of tens of thousands of
Japanese-Americans without any showing of actual danger. By Vietnam, courts were evaluating the merits of claims that the entire war was unconstitutional. See, e.g., Orlando v. Laird,
317 F. Supp. 1013 (E.D.N.Y. 1970), qffd, 443 F.2d 1039 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 869
(1971); pp. 143-52.
5. For a detailed treatment of this thesis, see A. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH
(1962). But see C. BLACK, THE PEOPLE AND THE COURT: JUDICIAL RE.VIEW IN A DEMOCRACY 34-55 (1960) (arguing that judicial legitimacy depends on the Court's active willingness
to limit the other branches).
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the death penalty, and states simply replaced invalidated statutes
with new ones. The litigators were thus left to start over from
scratch.
Another shortcoming of cause litigation has been overinclusiveness. Advocates often assume that all members of the putatively
benefitted class desire the benefit, without checking to see if this is
so. Hence feminists were unprepared to respond when a grassroots
women's movement led by Phyllis Schlafly blocked passage of the
Equal Rights Amendment. Overinclusiveness can be even more dangerous in litigation, where one adverse precedent can set back a
cause for years. For example, a number of convicts facing execution
have disavowed all efforts to save them, placing the cause litigator in
the uncomfortable position of arguing against the expressed wishes
of his client. Not surprisingly, the nine-year moratorium on executions has ended, and the adverse precedent derived from these cases
may mean that within the next few years many prisoners who do
want their sentences commuted are likely to die.
In Only Judgment, Neier focuses quite narrowly on the role of the
court in effecting social change. The reader must often rely on his
own knowledge of the changes in American society to understand
why the courts have played an assertive role. Neier relates how increased awareness of the inequities of segregation, coupled with
powerful Southern opposition to civil rights legislation in Congress,
made Brown v. Board of Education inevitable (pp. 31-33), but he
does not explain why a society that had ignored mental patients for
years came to defend their right to treatment. Additional background information would help the reader understand how and why
certain groups are perceived as worthy of the special protection of
the courts while others are not.
Neier's reassessment of his own role in the growth of advocacy
litigation illustrates a dilemma faced by many public-interest attorneys. They see an injustice and want to correct it as swiftly as possible. Should they be concerned with abstract propositions of judicial
restraint? In practice, most cause litigators invite the courts to decide
all cause-related disputes, trusting the courts to find their own limits.
Neier's arguments suggest that cause litigators should assume responsibility for the consequences of turning to the courts to solve all
of America's ills - including both reduced respect for judicial pronouncements and delayed resolution of all disputes as a result of the
increased volume of litigation.6
6. Shortly after Neier stepped down as director of the American Civil Liberties Union, the
ACLU began a constitutional challenge to draft registration. See CIVIL LIBERTIES, June 1980,
at I, col. I. Under Neier's analysis this issue is not properly for the courts to resolve, since
eighteen-year-old males as a class suffer no special political disadvantages. Neier's logic apparently did not persuade his successors.
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Due to the success of persons like Neier, many Americans have
come to expect judicial review of any government action as a matter
of right. This increased reliance on cause litigation has significantly
affected the way we view our government - and, thanks to decisions
like Brown, the way we view each other. Only Judgment offers an
expert insider's perspective on the growth of cause litigation, and
provides both critics and supporters of judicial activism with much
to think about.

